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Abstract
In this paper we consider the newsvendor model with real options. We consider a mixed
contract where the retailer can order a combination of q units subject to the conditions
in a classical newsvendor contract and Q real options on the same items. We provide a
closed form solution to this mixed contract when the demand is discrete and study some
of its properties. We also oer an explicit solution for the continuous case. In particular
we demonstrate that a mixed contract may be superior to a real option contract when a
manufacturer has a bound on how much variance she is willing to accept.
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1 Introduction
It is important for a rm to establish eective supply contracts with their suppliers/byers to
enhance their performance in the supply chain. In capital-intensive industries improvements
in the coordination of supply and demand may carry large economic benets (Kleindorfer and
Wu (2003). Recently supply chain researchers have studied the performance of mixing two or
more contracts, as the wholesale contract, the real option contracts and the usage of the spot
marked to improve the performance of one or more parties in the supply chain. The focus has
been mainly on how the byers can establish eective supply contracts with their suppliers to
achieve benets as increased exibility, reduce cost and adequate supply. Some authors have
also focused on the pricing strategy of the suppliers.
1In this paper we study the mix of a wholesale and a real option contract, and compare the
performance of the mixed contract both with the single wholesale contract and with the real
option contract. We model the negotiation process as a Stackelberg game, where the supplier
is the leader and determines the wholesale price, and the option- and exercise price for the real
option contract. Initially we assume that the agents are risk-neutral in the sense that they only
care about expected prots. When two contracts have the same expected prot, however, the
contract oering the lowest variance will be preferred.
The game is divided into two separate stages. At the rst stage the supplier (leader) oers
a wholesale contract, and chooses the wholesale price to maximize her expected prot. The
buyer (follower) chooses the order quantity that maximizes his expected prot. We assume that
both parties have full information on the demand distribution. The resulting contract is pareto
optimal, and we will refer to this contract as the original contract.
At the second stage of the game the supplier is faced with the original contract, and wants to
design a mixed contract to further advance prots. A new contract is feasible only if both parties
have at least as much expected prot as in the original contract. The supplier hence search a
feasible mixed contract to optimize prots.
If the supplier is risk-neutral, she can always extract all extra expected prot using a pure
real option contract. A mixed contract cannot advance expected prots further since there is
nothing more to take. If the supplier is risk-averse in the sense that she has a bound on how
much variance she can tolerate, however, we show that expected prots can be enhanced con-
siderably more by mixed contracts than by pure real option contracts. The explanation for this
is quite simple. In the mixed contract the supplier has zero variance from the wholesale part
of the contract, and as a consequence of this the variance of her prot falls much more rapidly
(in comparison with the pure real option case) when the usage of the wholesale contract increases.
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we give a literature review to explain how our
theory ts in the existing literature in the eld. In Section 3 we review the basic properties
of the newsvendor and real option contracts. The main result is Proposition 3.1 which oers
2a closed form solution for the mixed contract in the discrete case. In Section 4 we examine
some numerical examples to illustrate the some of the properties of the mixed contracts. In
Section 5 we study the performance of mixed contracts for a risk-averse supplier. In particular
we demonstrate that a mixed contract is superior to a real option contracts in enhancing prots
for the supplier. In Section 7 we provide explicit formulas for the continuous case. Finally in
Section 8 we oer some concluding remarks.
2 Literature review
A mixed option and wholesale contract has previously been addressed also by other authors in
dierent type of settings. Cheng et al. (2003) considered a mixed wholesale and option contract
for an exogenously given wholesale price. For the option contract to be eective, they suggest
that the exercise price should be less than the wholesale price in the forward contract. Other-
wise, they show that the supplier will take most of the prot improvement, leaving the buyer
with little incentive to procure the options. To overcome this diculty and achieve channel co-
ordination, they propose a simple negotiation mechanism to share the prot improvement over
the newsvendor model. Burnetas and Ritchken (2005) consider a mixed wholesale and option
contract when the retailers demand distribution is inuenced by pricing decisions (the retailer
has an uncertain downward sloping demand curve). They show that the introduction of option
contracts into the wholesale contract causes the wholesale price to increase and the volatility of
the retail price to decrease. Conditions are derived under which the supplier is always better
o with a mixed contract. They further nd that the retailer will benet from a mixed contract
only if the demand uncertainty is low.
Barnes-Schuster et al (2002) consider a two-periodic mixed forward- and option- contract where
the supplier has exibility in choosing between a normal and a more expensive expedite produc-
tion. They illustrate how options provide exibility for the buyer to respond to market changes
in the second period, but note that options not always coordinate the channel and may alleviate
the individual rationality constraint. Barnes-Schuster et al (2002) show that contracts as the
backup agreements analysed by Eppen and Iyer (1997), the quantity exibility contract analysed
3by Bassok and Anupindi 1998, Tsay and Lovejoy 1999, and the pay-to-delay capacity reservation
contracts analyzed by Brown and Lee (1997), are all special cases of their proposed model. A
byer-supplier relationship with two ordering opportunities is also discussed/considered in Zhou
and Wang (2009) and Weng (2004).
In the recent year there has been a focus on papers that combine the traditional long-term
contracts, with the option of using spot market to sell the participants excess inventory or to
buy additional inventory depending on the need. A literature survey that presents and discusses
the literature that considers integrating long term contract as forward and options with short-
term spot contracts in capital-intensive industries is given by Kleindorfer and Wu (2003). They
illustrate the reviewed work with examples of goods and services currently being traded in both
short-run and long-term contract markets and discuss the challenges of implementation. They
conclude the survey by addressing unexplored research questions in the literature. A more re-
cent survey that focuses on supply chain operation in the precence of a spot market, by Haks oz
and Seshadri (2007), also reviews and discusses papers that consider the optimal mix of long
term contracts and the usage of the spot market. They mention Akella et al (2001) and Seifert
et al (2004) that mainly address the procurement problem for the buyer, and Wu et al (2002)
and Golovachkina and Bradley (2002) that also consider the buyer-supplier coordination. More
specic, Wu et al (2002) and Golovachkina and Bradley (2002) consider a real option capacity
reservation contract where both parties have access to the spot marked and the supplier has
limited capacity while the spot market has unlimited supply. Golovachkina and Bradley (2002)
focus on how access to the spot market aect buyer{seller coordination, while Wu et al (2002)
study how to nd the optimal balance between selling capacity using a forward contract and
reserving capacity to sell in the spot market for a single supplier and multiple byer supply chain.
Both papers conclude that the optimal strategy for the supplier is to \set the exercise price suf-
ciently low to guarantee that the byer will exercise the options and set the reservation price to
achieve the trade-o between immediate and future revenues", Golovachkina and Bradley (2002).
A buyer of commodity products has typically many dierent suppliers to procure from. By
selecting the right mix of contracts from the long-term marked (wholesale and option) and the
short term (spot) marked the buyer may increase the exibility and enhance the prot. Martinez-
4de-Albeniz and Simchi-Levi (2005) address the multi-periodic supplier selection problem for a
byer with access to forward contracts, real option contracts, and the spot marked. They study
how the byer can nd the portfolio of contracts that maximizes his expected prot, based on
the exibility-price trade-o of the potential contracts. This setting is particularly meaning-
ful for commodity products where a large pool of suppliers is available. Through numerical
examples, Martinez-de-Albeniz, and Simchi-Levi (2005), show that the \expected protability
of a portfolio contract dominates the long-term contract both in terms of the mean and the
variance of prot", while the real \option contracts may attain less prot variability compared
to the portfolio contracts". In order for the suppliers to get the buyers attention they have to
compete on price and exibility. In Mart nez-de-Alb eniz and Simchi-Levi (2005) the suppliers'
bids are exogenous, i.e., there is no competition among the suppliers. Mart nez-de-Alb eniz and
Simchi-Levi (2009) analyze the behavior of the suppliers when they compete on the attention
from the byer. They present the optimal conditions for suppliers' bids and provided necessary
conditions for equilibrium bids in a one periodic model. They nd that the equilibria in pure
strategies give rise to what they call cluster competition. Hazra and Mahadevan (2009) also
address the supplier selection problem for a byer with access to both the spot marked and to
long-term contracts through a supplier bidding process. They model the pricing behavior of
the suppliers (oering capacity both through long term contracts and at the spot market) and
derive expressions for the optimal contract mix for the buyer.
Serel (2009) discusses how to design a long term multi-period capacity reservation contract be-
tween a byer and a long-term supplier when the byer also has access to a spot marked. The
long-term contract gives the byer access to a given volume in each period for a predetermined
price. Serel (2009) derives an optimal inventory policy and presents numerical results that show
that as uncertainty in the spot marked increases, the usage of the long-term contract increases.
Further, Serel (2009) note that the usage of the long-term contract also benet the supplier
through an increase in the utilization of the supplier capacity. Li et al (2009) consider a dy-
namic market where the buyer faces uncertainty in price and demand. Initially they discuss the
buyer's trade-o between periodically purchasing from the spot market and signing a long-term
contract with a single supplier. Then, they studied mixed strategies, purchasing commitments
and contract cancellations. From computational results they nd that increases in price (de-
5mand) uncertainty favor long-term (short-term) suppliers.
Caldentey and Haugh (2009) study the benets of using nancial markets for a supply chain
with a single supplier and a single budget constrained buyer. In their study they consider the
standard wholesale contract (Cachon 2003), a exible wholesale contract (the price and order
quantity are contingent upon the history of the nancial market up to the time for the physical
transaction of goods) and a exible wholesale contract where the retailer is able to hedge his
budget constraint. They categorize scenarios in which the introduction of nancial markets
benets both the byer and the supplier and show that the supplier always will improve his per-
formance if the buyer is able to hedge his budget constraint, while the buyer might actually be
worse o when he can hedge his budget constraint.
Martinez-de-Albeniz, and Simchi-Levi (2006) study the trade-os faced by a byer signing a port-
folio of forward and real option contracts with its suppliers (incurring inventory risk) and having
access to a spot market (incurring spot price risk). They quantify the inventory risk and the
spot price risk by studying the prot mean and variance for a given portfolio of contracts. Dong
and Liu (2007) discuss the benets of using a forward contract in addition to the spot market
in a supply chain with two risk-averse participants who both have market powers. They report
(nd) that a rm's need for risk hedging is one potential fundamental driving force and show
how risk can be reduced, shared, or shifted between the risk-averse participants in the supply
chain. Managing risk in the supply chain is dicult, e.g., reducing (mitigating) one risk may
increase another. Successful management of supply chain risks starts with an understanding
of the various threats, individually and collectively (Sodhi and Lee (2007)). A variety of risks
(strategic and operational) in the consumer electronics industry is studied in Sodhi and Lee
(2007), some of them is accompanied with Samsung's response to the threat.
This work extends previous literature in that we study a mixed wholesale and real option con-
tract with an endogenous determined wholesale price and provide closed form solution for both
the suppliers pricing problem and the buyers procurement problem. Further, we provide new
insight for the properties of the mixed contract. In particular we demonstrate that a mixed
contract is superior for the manufacturer compared to a real option contract when the manu-
6facturer is risk-averse (the variance of the expected prot is bounded above).
3 Theory
3.1 The classical newsvendor model
In the classical newsvendor model a retailer plans to sell a commodity in a market with uncer-
tain demand. The retailer orders a number of units of the commodity from a manufacturer, and
hopes to sell suciently many of these units to make a prot. We assume that the manufacturer
faces a xed manufacturing cost M and decides the wholesale price W, while the retailer can sell
at a revenue price R and decides the order quantity q. We further assume that the retailer has
complete knowledge of the distribution of market demand D (a random variable), and that the
retailers selling price (R) is exogenously determined and known. Unsold items can be salvaged
at the specic price S. The mathematical solution to the classical newsvendor problem is very
well known, and we list some properties below for easy reference.
Retailer's prot
The retailer's prot is denoted by r(q). Prots in the newsvendor model can be rewritten in
several dierent ways. For the analysis we carry out in this paper it is convenient to express
everything in terms of the random variable min[D;q]. In that case
r(q) = (R   S)min[D;q]   (W   S)q (1)
Manufacturer's prot
The manufacturer's prot is denoted by m(q). In the newsvendor model the manufacturer has
a constant prot given by the expression
m(q) = (W   M)q (2)
Distribution of the demand
For simplicity we will assume that the demand D has a discrete distribution where the values
d1;d2;:::;dn have probabilities p1;p2;:::;pn. In the classical newsvendor model the retailer
7wants to choose an order q to maximize his expected prot. The optimal order quantity can






The optimal order quantity is then q = dk. In the degenerate case where
Pk
i=1 pi = R W
R S , the
expected prot is constant when q 2 [dk;dk+1]. In all other cases the optimal order quantity is
unique.
3.2 Real options
As an alternative to the contract in the newsvendor model the manufacturer can oer the re-
tailer a contract with real options. The price for one option is c. Each option oers the right
but not the obligation to buy one unit of goods at a xed price x. Real option contracts of this
type have been studied by many authors and the mathematical solution to the problem is very
well known. For easy reference we list some of the main properties below.
If the retailer buys Q options, his prot ^ r(Q;c;x) is given by
^ r(Q;c;x) = (R   x)min[D;Q]   cQ (3)
In this contract some of the risk is transferred to the manufacturer. The manufacturer's prot
is now a random variable ^ m(Q;c;x) given by
^ m(Q;c;x) = (x   S)min[D;Q]   (M   S   c)Q (4)
If the retailer wants to choose an order q to maximize his expected prot, the optimal order




R   c   x
R   x
The optimal order quantity is then q = dk. In the degenerate case where
Pk
i=1 pi = R c x
R x , the
expected prot is constant when q 2 [dk;dk+1]. In all other cases the optimal order quantity is
8unique.
3.3 The mixed contract
In this section we wish to dene a mixed contract where the retailer can order a quantity q
at the wholesale price W. In addition he can order a quantity Q of real options. As before
the price of each option is c and each option gives the right but not an obligation to buy one
unit of goods at the price x. The retailer's optimization problem is slightly more dicult as
it now involves two variables; q and Q. Nevertheless it turns out that the optimal choices can
be found by explicit formulas very similar to the one dimensional cases. The details are as follows:
If x  S, the retailer prefers to receive the full order q+Q, and the problem is in eect equivalent
to a pure newsvendor contract with W0 = min[W;x + c]. We will hence assume that x > S. If
the demand is D, the retailer makes a prot
r[q;Q] =  Wq   cQ +
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
RD + S(q   D) D  q
RD   x(D   q) q  D  q + Q
R(q + Q)   xQ q + Q  D
(5)
To simplify the analysis, we rewrite this as follows
r[q;Q] = (R W)q+(R x c)Q+
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
(R   S)D + (S   R)q + (x   R)Q D  q
(R   x)D + (x   R)q + (x   R)Q q  D  q + Q
0 q + Q  D
(6)
If dk  q < dk+1, dl  q+Q < dl+1, 1  k  l, the expected prot can be expressed on the form








((R   x)di + (x   R)q + (x   R)Q)pi (7)
After a rearrangement of terms, we get
E[r[q;Q]] = (x + c   W)q  
k X
i=1
(x   S)(q   di)pi
+ (R   x   c)(q + Q)  
l X
i=1
(R   x)(q + Q   di)pi (8)
If k = 0, i.e, 0  q < d1, dl  q + Q < dl+1, l  1, the rst sum does not appear and
E[r[q;Q]] = (x + c   W)q + (R   x   c)(q + Q)  
l X
i=1
(R   x)(q + Q   di)pi (9)
If 0  q < d1, 0  q + Q < d1, both sums do not appear and
E[r[q;Q]] = (x + c   W)q + (R   x   c)(q + Q) (10)
If W > x + c, it is clear that a global maximum for E[r[q;Q]] is obtained with q = 0, and if
x + c > R, a global maximum must have Q = 0. In these two cases, the problem is reduced to
a problem of pure contracts, and the solutions to these problems are well known. Moreover, if
W < c + S, it is better to salvage overstocked items than paying c upfront, and Q = 0 also in
that case. To get a non-degenerate solution, we assume that W  x + c  R, W  c + S, and
x > S.
A key issue is to dene the following pair of indices (k;l):




x + c   W
x   S
(11)




R   x   c
R   x
(12)
A closed form solution for the mixed contract can then be formulated as follows:
Proposition 3.1 Let the indices (k;l) be dened by (11){(12) and assume that W  x+c  R,
W  c + S, and x > S.
 If k  l, the expected prot E[r[q;Q]] has a global maximum at q = dk;Q = dl   dk.
 If k > l, a global maximum is obtained at a pure contract with Q = 0.
If any of the conditions W  x + c  R, W  c + S, and x > S are violated, the problem is
reduced to either a pure real option contract or a pure newsvendor contract:
 W > x + c, leads to a pure real option contract, i.e, q = 0.
 x + c > R, leads to a pure newsvendor contract, i.e., Q = 0.
 W < c + S, leads to a pure newsvendor contract, i.e., Q = 0.
 x  S and W  x + c, leads to a pure newsvendor contract, i.e., Q = 0.
 x  S and W > x+c, is equivalent to a pure newsvendor contract with W0 = x+c, and q = 0.
Proof See the appendix.
Some remarks
Proposition 3.1 gives a complete solution to the retailers optimization problem, and the key
issues to the solution are the indices dened by (11) and (12). The retailer knows for sure that
he will be able to sell the minimum demand D = d1 units. If W  x+c, the retailer will always
order q  d1 in the newsvendor part of the contract. If W  x + c;W  x + c, there is risk of
not selling more than d1 units and real options are a more favorable choice for additional orders.
This is reected in (11) as the right hand side is very small in this case, which in turn forces q
11down to the minimum d1 corresponding to the case k = 1.
If we gradually reduce W from the level W = x+c, the newsvendor part of the contract will be
increasingly favorable, i.e., the the retailer will order a larger fraction of the total order within
the newsvendor part of the contract. When W has become suciently low, the real option part
of the contract will be void because it has become too expensive compared with the alternative
contract. This is exactly what happens when we get k > l in Proposition 3.1.
It is interesting to note that W does not appear in (12). Hence it appears that the total order
level l is controlled by x and c alone. That is true in most cases, but when we get k > l, the
total order level may in general be dierent from l. In that case the problem is transferred to
a pure newsvendor contract, and in this contract the value of W controls the total order level.
See Example 4.2.
3.4 Expected prots for the manufacturer
If the demand is D and x > S, the manufacturer makes a prot
m[q;Q] = Wq + cQ   M(q + Q) +
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
SQ D  q
x(D   q) + S(q + Q   D) q  D  q + Q
xQ q + Q  D
(13)
If we combine (13) with (5) we see that the prot for the supply chain is given by
chain[q;Q] = r[q;Q] + m[q;Q] = (R   S)min[D;q + Q]   (M   S)(q + Q) (14)
Note that W;x and c do not appear in (14) as these prices only redistribute wealth between the
retailer and the manufacturer. The optimal order quantity q
chain for the supply chain can be







chain = dk, and in the mixed contract optimal expected prot for the supply chain is
12obtained at any combination of q;Q satisfying q + Q = q
chain.
3.5 Feasibility
We are assuming that the manufacturer decides the prices W;c and x, and tries to nd combi-
nations of these prices to maximize her expected prot. One particular scenario that we have in
mind, however, is a setting where the retailer initially is oered a standard newsvendor contract
(the original contract). In the original contract the manufacturer has chosen W to maximize her
expected prot. When the manufacturer oers a new (mixed) contract she must keep in mind
that the retailer will accept a new contract only if the expected prot from the new contract
is at least as high as in the original contract. Any combination of W;c;x leading to a mixed
contract where the expected prot is at least as high as in the original contract is called feasible.
Note that W in the new contract need not be equal to the particular W used in the original
contract.
When we search for feasible combinations of (W;c;x) to maximize expected prots for the
manufacturer, the following principles are very useful: The manufacturer should seek feasible
combinations where the expected prot for the supply chain is as large as possible while the
expected prot for the retailer is as small as possible. If, in particular, we can nd (W;c;x) such
that
 q + Q = q
chain
 Expected prot for the retailer is equal to expected prot in the original contract
it is clear that expected prot for the manufacturer cannot be advanced further without break-
ing the feasibility constraints, i.e., such combinations must provide a global optimum for the
manufacturer.
In all the numerical examples in Section 4 such special combinations can be found. The search
can then be carried out very quickly as it suces to search alternatives where q + Q = q
chain.
Notice, however, that this principle fails in the example shown in Section 5. In that case
we can no longer be sure that a global optimum is obtained when q + Q = q
chain, and it is
13necessary to trace the whole domain of denition to be sure that a global maximum has been
found. Some special care must then be taken as many standard optimization programs cannot
handle discontinuous functions of this type. As the function is piecewise continuous with no
strong gradients and the dimension of the search space is quite low, a simple grid search seems
appropriate, and is what we used in Section 5 and 6.
4 Numerical examples
To illustrate the theory in Section 3, we consider a demand D with n = 10 dierent values
(d1;d2;:::;d10) = (10;20;30;40;50;60;70;80;90;100)
with uniform probabilities and where
R = 10;M = 4;S = 1
These values will be xed throughout this section. The other variables W;c;x are chosen by the
manufacturer and depends on the manufacturer's level of information.
4.1 Example
In this example we consider a version where the manufacturer has no or very little information
on D, and oers the retailer a mixed contract with
W = 7;c = 3;x = 5
To nd the optimal order quantities, we use (11) and (12). Since
x + c   W
x   S
= 0:25
we get k = 3 in (11). Correspondingly
R   x   c
R   x
= 0:4
14leads to l = 5 in (12). Since k < l, it follows from Proposition 3.1 that the optimal order
quantities are
q = d3 = 30 Q = d5   d3 = 20
Expected prots using this contract is shown in Table 1.
Mixed contract: W = 7;c = 3;x = 5;q = 30;Q = 20
Manufacturer Retailer
Expected prot 142.00 68.00
Standard deviation 36.00 94.11
Table 1: Expected prots in Example 4.1
4.2 Example
This example is similar to the previous example. The only dierence is that W is smaller.
W = 5;c = 3;x = 5
To nd the optimal order quantities, we use (11) and (12). Since
x + c   W
x   S
= 0:75
we get k = 8 in (11). Correspondingly
R   x   c
R   x
= 0:4
leads to l = 5 in (12). Since k > l, it follows from Proposition 3.1 that Q = 0. That leads
to a pure newsvendor contract with W = 5, and the optimal order quantity in that contract is
q = 60. Note that the solution is neither equal to dk = 80 nor dl = 50 in this case. Expected
prots using this contract is shown in Table 2.
15Mixed contract: W = 5;c = 3;x = 5;q = 60;Q = 0
Manufacturer Retailer
Expected prot 60.00 165.00
Standard deviation 0.00 162.25
Table 2: Expected prots in Example 4.2
4.3 Example
In this example we assume that the manufacturer has full information on D, and chooses W;c;x
to maximize her expected prot. We wish to compare the 3 dierent scenarios
 Classical newsvendor contracts
 Real option contracts (with or without feasibility constraints)
 Mixed contracts (with or without feasibility contraints)
 Classical newsvendor contract
In this case the manufacturer chooses W to maximize expected prot. Maximal expected prot
is obtained with W = 7:30, and expected prots are shown in Table 3.
Newsvendor contract: W = 7:30;q = 40
Manufacturer Retailer
Expected prot 132.00 54.00
Standard deviation 0 91.78
Table 3: Expected prots in a classical newsvendor model
 Unconstrained real option contract
In this case the manufacturer chooses c and x to maximize expected prot freely. Without
feasibility constraints the solution is degenerate, i.e., is obtained in the limit where
c ! 0+;x ! R 
in such a way that the retailer orders the supply chain maximum order. In the limit the
manufacturer takes all prot, leaving the retailer with an arbitrary small expected prot. An
approximate solution is shown in Table 4.
16Constrained real option contract: c = 0:00001;x = 9:99997;Q = 70
Manufacturer Retailer
Expected prot 231.00 0.0008
Standard deviation 194.91 0.0006
Table 4: Expected prots in a unconstrained real option contract
 Constrained real option contract
In this case the manufacturer chooses c and x to maximize expected prot, but must take into
account that the retailer must be oered a feasible contract, i.e., a contract where the retailer
has at least as much expected prot as in the newsvendor contract above. Since D is discrete,
maximum prot is obtained on a line segment, i.e., there are innitely many solutions. Among
these solutions we assume that the manufacturer chooses the pair implying minimum variance.
This pair is unique, and is obtained at c = 1:03;x = 7:42, and expected prots are shown in
Table 5.
Constrained real option contract: c = 1:03;x = 7:425
Manufacturer Retailer
Expected prot 176.93 54.08
Standard deviation 139.14 55.77
Table 5: Expected prots in a constrained real option contract
 Unconstrained mixed contract
In this case the manufacturer chooses c;x and W to maximize expected prot freely. The
solution to this problem is the same as for the unconstrained real option contract above. The
manufacturer chooses W = 10 to obtain what is in eect a pure real option contract. Without
feasibility constraints the solution is degenerate, i.e., is obtained in the limit where
c ! 0+;x ! R  W = 10
in such a way that the retailer orders the supply chain maximum order. In the limit the
manufacturer takes all prot, leaving the retailer with an arbitrary small expected prot. An
approximate solution is shown in Table 6.
17Unconstrained mixed contract: c = 0:00001;x = 9:99997;W = 10;q = 0;Q = 70
Manufacturer Retailer
Expected prot 231.00 0.0008
Standard deviation 194.91 0.0006
Table 6: Expected prots in a unconstrained mixed option contract
18 Constrained mixed option contract
In this case the manufacturer chooses c;x and W to maximize expected prot, but must take into
account that the retailer must be oered a feasible contract, i.e., a contract where the retailer
has at least as much expected prot as in the newsvendor contract above. The optimal choice
for the manufacturer turns out to be a combination of a newsvendor contract that is equal to
the original newsvendor contract plus a degenerate part where the retailer sells the real option
part for a marginal prot. This contract is obtained in the limit where
c ! 0+;x ! R  W = 7:30
in such a way that the retailer orders the supply chain maximum order. An approximate solution
is shown in Table 7.
Constrained mixed contract: c = 0:00001;x = 9:99997;W = 7:299;q = 40;Q = 30
Manufacturer Retailer
Expected prot 176.96 54.04
Standard deviation 122.41 91.78
Table 7: Expected prots in a constrained mixed option contract
If we compare this contract with the contrained real option contract above, we see that the
manufacturer obtains the same expected prot in the two cases. That is not surprising as the
real option contract can be designed to produce a contract where the feasibility constraint is
binding, i.e., it is impossible to advance prots beyond that point. It is interesting to note,
however, that the manufacturer can obtain a signicantly smaller variance (122.41 compared to
139.14) via the mixed contract.
5 Mixed contracts under risk-aversion and variance constraints
As the manufacturer can always obtain maximal expected prot via real option contracts, mixed
contracts cannot further advance expected prots. In the previous section we showed that a
smaller variance of the expected prot for the manufacturer can sometimes be obtained, but
our example only covers a very unrealistic case where the retailer agrees to sell goods for a
marginally small prot. In this section, however, we will see that mixed contracts can enhance
19manufacturers prots considerably if the manufacturer is risk-averse. The basic idea can be
illustrated by the following example:
We return to the case considered in Table 7. In that case the manufacturer obtains an expected
prot of 176.96 with a standard deviation of 122.41. In the original newsvendor contract the
manufacturer has no risk, and a standard deviation of 122.41 imposes a considerable risk of
losing money. If this implies a too high risk of bankruptcy, the manufacturer cannot oer this
contract. Alternatively she will search for a new contract with a smaller risk, and clearly she
must give up some prot to achieve that.
We will consider a new case where the manufacturer sets a limit to how much variance she can
allow, and consider the case where
sd[m[q;Q]]  100 (15)
That corresponds to a risk-averse manufacturer with a utility function




expected prot if standard deviation  100
 1 otherwise
(16)
At this stage it is important to remark that the retailer is risk-neutral, so the solution for the
order quantities in Proposition 3.1 still applies.
If the extra condition in (15) is imposed, we must carry out a constrained search for alternatives
satisfying (15). We will compare two cases: In the rst case we use a real option contract, and
in the second case we consider the same problem with a mixed contract. The nal results are
shown in the tables below.
Variance constrained real option contract: c = 1:753;x = 5:617;Q = 70
Manufacturer Retailer
Expected prot 138.94 92.06
Standard deviation 99.99 94.92
20Table 8: Variance constrained real option contract
Variance constrained mixed contract : c = 0:66;x = 8:35;W = 6:80;q = 40;Q = 30
Manufacturer Retailer
Expected prot 152.05 78.95
Standard deviation 99.97 107.71
Table 9: Variance constrained mixed contract
Inspecting the results in Tables 8 and 9, we see that both problems have non-degenerate solu-
tions, i.e., solutions obtained at inner points of the domains. We also see that a mixed contract
oers a much more ecient way of reducing the variance for the manufacturer. With real op-
tion contracts, the manufacturer must give up 38.02 units of prot to obtain a variance that is
suciently low, while in the mixed case it suces to give up 24.91 units of prot to achieve this.
The explanation for this is quite simple. In the mixed contract the manufacturer has zero vari-
ance on the newsvendor part of the contract, and as a consequence of this the variance falls
much more rapidly (in comparison to the real option case) when q increases.
Alternative constraints
In the previous example we considered a constraint on the form
sd[m[q;Q]]  sdmax (17)




where C is a given constant. Mathematically there is hardly any dierence between the two
constraints, but the unit free expression in (18) might be easier to interpret. If m[q;Q] is
close to a normal distribution, a value C = 2 in (18) would imply that there is roughly 2.5%
chance of negative prots, and generally C is the number of standard deviations that are needed
before losses are incurred.
216 The continuous case
The main emphasis in this paper has been on the case when D is discrete. In our opinion the
discrete case is more interesting as it features several issues that do not appear in the continuous
case. In particular the discrete case is challenging due to degenerate cases with innitely many
solutions. These problems usually disappear in the continuous case.
As any continuous distribution can be approximated arbitrary well by a discrete distribution,
however, the formulas for the continuous case comes more or less for free by passing to the limit.
The basic result can be stated as follows:
Corollary 6.1 Assume that D has a continuous distribution with cumulative function FD and




















 If u  v, the expected prot E[r(q;Q)] has a unique global maximum at q = u;Q = v   u.
 If u > v, the unique global maximum is obtained at q = w;Q = 0.
If any of the conditions W  x + c  R, W  c + S, and x > S are violated, the problem is
reduced to either a pure real option contract or a pure newsvendor contract:
 If min[W;x + c]  R, then q = 0;Q = 0.
 If W > x + c and x + c < R, then q = 0;Q = v.
 If x + c > R and W < R, then q = w;Q = 0.
 If W < c + S, then q = w;Q = 0.
 If x  S and W  x + c, then q = w;Q = 0.








We now consider the case where D is N(;2), with  = 160 and  = 40. To carry out the
analysis, we rst need to compute the reference values for the original newsvendor contract. As
22before we use the values R = 10;M = 4;S = 1. Optimal prot for the manufacturer is then
obtained using W = 8:95, and the results are shown in Table 10.
Newsvendor contract: W = 8:95;q = 112:33
Manufacturer Retailer
Expected prot 556.00 97.44
Standard deviation 0 76.48
Table 10: Expected prots for the original newsvendor model
The optimal order quantity for the supply chain is obtained using q = 177:23 with a total prot
of 829:12, leaving considerable room for improvement. Like in Section 5, we assume that the
manufacturer has a bound on how much variance she can tolerate, and we hence assume that
standard deviation cannot exceed, e.g., 100. Prots under that constraint can be enhanced using
a pure real option contract, and the optimal contract for the manufacturer is obtained using
c = 1:98;x = 7:16. The results for this contract are shown in Table 11.
Real option contract: c = 1:984;x = 7:160;Q = 139:2
Manufacturer Retailer
Expected prot 668.77 97.44
Standard deviation 100.00 46.10
Table 11: Variance constrained real option contract
As we already observed in the discrete case, a mixed contract can increase prots even fur-
ther. In the mixed case, the optimal contract for the manufacturer is obtained using the values
W = 8:961;c = 0:218;x = 9:674. The results for this contract are shown in Table 12.
Mixed contract : c = 0:2176;x = 9:6739;W = 8:9612;q = 110:35;Q = 32:35
Manufacturer Retailer
Expected prot 679.80 97.44
Standard deviation 99.93 74.54
Table 12: Variance constrained mixed contract
If we compare Table 11 and 12, we see that the mixed contract is performing considerably better.
The mixed contract enhances the supply chain prot from 653.44 in the newsvendor contract, to
23777.23 for the mixed contract. There is still a some distance to the maximal supply chain prot,
which is 829.12, but the manufacturer cannot advance the supply chain prot further unless she
reduces her prot or violates the variance constraint.
7 Concluding remarks
This work extends previous literature in that we study a mixed wholesale and real option con-
tract where the wholesale price is determined by the manufacturer together with the option and
exercise price of the real option contract. We derive the optimal pricing strategy for the manu-
facturer, and the optimal procurement strategy for the retailer. We show that mixed contracts
can enhance prots considerably if the manufacturer is risk-averse and that a mixed contract is
superior to a real option contract in that it more eciently reduces the variance of the prot.
To be able to apply the explicit formulas in Proposition 3.1 (discrete case) or Corollary 6.1
(continuous case), we need to assume that the retailer is risk-neutral. No such assumptions are
needed for the manufacturer. In fact the explicit utility function used in (16) could have been
replaced by an arbitrary function of expectation and variance. Such extensions are outside the
scope of the present paper and are left for future research.
8 Appendix
In this appendix we provide the full details for the proof of Proposition 3.1.
Lemma 8.1 Let 0  C  dn be a constant and dene fC : [0;C] ! R by
fC[q] = E[r[q;C   q]]
If W  x + c, fC is non-decreasing on [0;min[C;dk]] and non-increasing on [min[C;dk];C].
Hence fC has a global maximum at q = min[C;dk].
Proof To simplify the notation we dene
~ di = min[di;C] i = 1;:::;n
24Since W  x+c, it follows from (9) or (10), that fC is non-decreasing on [0; ~ d1]. Let k0  1, and
consider fC on the interval [~ dk0; ~ dk0+1]. By denition of k and (8) it is easy to see that q 7! fC[q]
is non-decreasing on [~ dk0; ~ dk0+1] if k0 < k, and q 7! fC[q] is non-increasing on [~ dk0; ~ dk0+1] if k0  k.
Since fC is continuous, this proves the lemma.
Lemma 8.2 Let 0  q  dn be a constant and dene gq : [0;dn   q] ! R by
gq[Q] = E[r[q;Q]]
If R  x+c, gq is non-decreasing on [0;max[dl q;0]] and non-increasing on [max[dl q;0];dn q].
Hence gq has a global maximum at q = max[dl   q;0].
Proof This lemma follows easily from the denition of l together with (8), (9) and (10).
Proof of Proposition 3.1
Proof Assume that k  l, and let 0  q0  dn, 0  Q0  dn. If q0  dl, then by Lemma 8.1 and
8.2
E[r[q0;Q0]]  E[r[q0;dl   q0]]  E[r[dk;dl   dk]]
If q0  dl, then
E[r[q0;Q0]]  E[r[q0;0]]  E[r[dl;q0   dl]]  E[r[dl;0]]  E[r[dk;dl   dk]]
proving that q = dk;Q = dl   dk is a global maximum for E[r[q;Q]]. That completes the
proof in the case k  l.
We now consider the second case where l < k, and let 0  q0  dn, 0  Q0  dn. If q0 < dl, then
by Lemma 8.1 and 8.2
E[r[q0;Q0]]  E[r[q0;dl   q0]]  E[r[dl;0]]
If q0  dl, then by Lemma 8.2
E[r[q0;Q0]]  E[r[q0;0]]
25This proves that a global maximum must be obtained at a point where Q = 0. If Q = 0, the
problem is reduced to a classical newsvendor problem.
If any of the conditions W  x + c  R, W  c + S, and x > S are violated, the problem is
reduced to either a pure real option contract or a pure newsvendor contract. The solutions for
these cases are straightforward and follows from the results in Section 3.1 and 3.2. Notice in
particular that if x  S, then formula (5) does not apply. That case must hence be handled
separately.
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